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Abstract 
This paper argues for the (re)construction of citizenship of the European Union as an autonomous 
status. As opposed to the current legal regime, whereby individuals with nationality of a Member 
State are automatically granted citizenship of the Union, under this proposal individuals would be 
free to choose whether or not to adopt the status of citizen of an incipient European polity. At 
present, the telos and essence of citizenship of the Union is contested. It may be argued that the 
status is partial or incomplete. This has informed competing normative perspectives. ‘Maximalist’ 
positions praise the judicial construction of Union citizenship as destined to be the ‘fundamental 
status’ for all Member State nationals. By contrast, ‘minimalist’ positions argue that the status 
should remain ‘additional to’ Member State nationality, and the rights created therein should 
remain supplementary to the status and rights derived from national citizenship. This paper will 
argue for a new approach to the dilemma. By emancipating the condition for acquisition of EU 
citizenship from nationality of a Member State, and reconstructing it as an autonomous choice for 
individuals, it is tentatively suggested that a new constitutional settlement for Europe may be 
generated. 
Keywords: EU citizenship; Existential Crisis; Future of Europe; Autonomous status; European 
Union 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE 
 
What is citizenship of the European Union? Is it a fundamental legal, political, and societal status 
for those who hold it? Or is it a disparate collection of economically orientated international treaty 
rights granted in order to facilitate the raison d'être of European market integration? The ambiguity 
of this question is microcosmic of the general ambiguity surrounding the contested concept and 
telos of the European Union. It remains the paradigmatic ‘Unidentified Political Object’.1 This 
indeterminacy means that citizenship of the European Union is both an existential and an 
existentialist concept – its ‘existence precedes its essence’.2 Following its coming into existence, in 
what is now Article 20 TFEU, its essence has been constructed in an iterative and ad hoc manner 
through the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
                                                 
* PhD Researcher at the European University Institute, Florence. Editor at the European Journal of Legal Studies and 
the European Law Blog. Email: oliver.garner@eui.eu. I would like to thank Rainer Bauböck, Floris de Witte, Urška 
Šadl, Martijn van den Brink, and the participants in the EUI EU Law Working Group and Political and Legal 
Theory Working Group meeting of 14th December 2017 for comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
1 J Delors, Speech at the First Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg, 9th September 1985. 
2 ‘What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters 
himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards’. J-P Sartre, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, Lecture 
of 29th October 1945.  
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Such avant-garde application of law was praised in the hubristic afterglow of Maastricht and the 
Eastern expansion in the 1990s and 2000s. However, in the last decade, the manifold failures of 
the Union have provoked a prevailing nausea. Crises – constitutional, financial, humanitarian, and 
most recently secessionist – have agglomerated and become endemic: the European Union now 
finds itself in existential crisis.3 Such crisis over existence and essence spreads also to citizenship. 
The ‘constructive’ nature of citizenship now looks precarious rather than progressive. At the 
micro-level, a shift in the case law of the CJEU to a more restrictive interpretation of the ambit of 
EU citizens’ rights has provoked uncertainty for individuals and claims of inequity from academics. 
At the macro-level, the looming loss of the status for every national of the United Kingdom as a 
result of the Member State’s withdrawal has shattered the Court's idealistic vision that citizenship 
of the Union is set to become the fundamental status for the peoples of Europe.4 This contestation 
could have come to a crescendo if the Court of Justice of the European Union were called upon 
to determine whether nationality of a Member State is a necessary condition for the retention of 
the status in the same way that it is a condition sine qua non for its acquisition. On 7th February 
2018, in proceedings brought by UK nationals resident in the Netherlands, the Amsterdam District 
Court made the decision to refer to the Court of Justice the question of whether the withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom automatically leads to the loss of EU citizenship for that Member State’s 
nationals. 5  This could have precipitated the authoritative pronouncement of a settled and binding 
definition of the existential status.  However, on 19th June 2018, the decision to refer these 
questions was reversed on appeal on the basis that the claims were not yet ‘sufficiently concrete’.6  
Regardless of the outcome of this specific case, disquiet remains regarding the normative 
legitimacy of a judicial body fulfilling such a constitutive role.  
This paper will provide an argument for the future of citizenship of the Union as an 
autonomous status. In Section II, four eras in the self-development of the existential status will be 
presented. In Section III, the different academic positions on the essence of citizenship will be 
analysed. These will be categorised according to a reductive dichotomy between ‘maximal’ and 
‘minimal’ approaches. This will inform the proposal in Section IV for a third normative approach 
advocating the creation of citizenship as an autonomous status for those who choose to constitute 
themselves as a European people. Within such a proposal, an individual’s ‘nationality’ is recognised 
as an immutable element of their facticity. By contrast, an individual’s ‘citizenship’ is construed as 
a choice that falls within the ambit of the existential freedom that every individual possesses, and 
may choose to exercise in order to constitute themselves into a collective.  It is envisaged that the 
creation of such a status would be generative of a new constitutional settlement for Europe. This 
                                                 
3 A-J Menendez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union' in 'Special Issue: Regeneration Europe’ (2013) 14 
(5) German Law Journal 453. 
4 For more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see O Garner ‘After Brexit: Protecting EU citizens and 
citizenship from Fragmentation’ EUI Law Working Paper 2016/22. 
5 C/13/640244 / KG ZA 17-1327 of the Rechtbank Amsterdam of 7th February 2018 – NL: RBAMS: 2018:605. 
Accessible at: https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:605. 
For an English translation see https://waitingfortax.com/2018/02/13/decision-of-the-district-court-in-
amsterdam/; see also comment at <http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/02/19/does-member-state-withdrawal-from-
the-european-union-extinguish-eu-citizenship-c13640244-kg-za-17-1327-rechtbank-amsterdam-the-amsterdam-
case/>.  
6 C/13/640244/ KG ZA 17-1327 of the Rechtbank Amsterdam of 19th June 2018 - NL:GHAMS:2018:2009. 
Accessible at: 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2018:2009&pk_campaign=rss&pk_medi
um=rss&pk_keyword=uitspraken 
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would allow for the definition of the essence of European citizenship by those who choose to 
hold it, two decades after its coming into existence. 
 
II. THE FOUR ERAS OF EU CITIZENSHIP: FROM AN INCIPIENT ESSENCE TO 
REGRESSION 
 
This section will identify four eras in the development of citizenship of the European Union. Such 
categorisation is useful for establishing the current essence of the status. In turn, this orientates 
the arguments for future development. These eras are: (i) the pre-Maastricht ‘incipient status’ era 
in which the disparate threads of the individual’s legal status in EU law were developed; (ii) the 
post-Maastricht ‘scepticism’ era in which these threads were agglomerated into the holistic status 
of a ‘citizenship’ that was perceived as deficient; (iii) the post-Rudy Grzelczyk ‘fundamental destiny’ 
era in which the Court of Justice actively constructed the substance of citizenship, and (iv) the 
post-Dano ‘regression’ era in which decisions of the Court of Justice limiting the ambit of rights 
for Union citizens have been fiercely criticised on the basis of their perceived injustice. These eras 
are indicative of a status that undergoes an iterative process of self-definition, development, and 
change in a manner comparable to philosophical existential views on the malleability of human 
nature. This suggests that EU citizenship is capable of entering a new era predicated upon 
autonomy and the choice of individuals to become the constituent subjects of a new European 
constitutional order.  
 
A. The ‘incipient’ era 
 
Although it has been suggested already that the existence of EU citizenship precedes its essence, 
it is possible to identify some incipient threads of this essence in the era preceding the creation of 
the status in 1992. Carlos Closa has argued that an ‘incipient and partial form of citizenship was 
being developed in parallel to two facts: the rights that the progressive completion of the internal 
market…granted to individuals…and the need to differentiate between those individuals from 
citizens of non-Member States’.7 This first element captures how individuals, as a result of the 
integration process between their Member States, became the passive recipients of the legal right 
of free movement that would come to form the ostensible ‘core’8 of citizenship. The second 
element pertains to the political requirement to establish boundaries between those who belong in 
a community and those who do not. The generation and definition of these boundaries is a crucial 
aspect of the constituent role of individuals in constructing and legitimating constitutional orders.9 
However, the reason why this status was only partial is because the granting of the first dimension 
of legal rights was not predicated on the generation of boundaries on the basis of equality between 
all of the nationals of the Member States. Instead, internal boundaries were perpetuated by which 
only those with the recognised autonomous sub-status of ‘worker’ could enjoy the full ambit of 
legal rights to free movement.10  
                                                 
7 C Closa, ‘The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union’ (1992) 29 (6) Common Market Law Review 
1137, pp 1139–1140. 
8 F de Witte, R Bauböck and J Shaw (eds), ‘Freedom of Movement under Attack : Is It Worth Defending as the 
Core of EU Citizenship?’ RSCAS Working Paper 2016/69.  
9 See H Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
10 Article 45 TFEU. 
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 Before 1992 the status and rights of individuals in the European legal order were an 
instrument to achieve the goals of the then-Community’s micro-economic constitution11 rather 
than being a self-constituted existential status of belonging. Therefore, the rights of individuals 
who did not fulfil the condition of economic activity, as defined in the Court of Justice’s case law,12 
were determined in a piecemeal manner through secondary legislation.13 Although this extended 
and codified the rights of free movement to the further sub-statuses of students and the retired, 
the stratification along the lines of financial capability was perpetuated by the condition that such 
individuals must have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on national social assistance 
systems.14 On the input side of the political rights which enable individuals to participate as subjects 
in the formulation of legal norms, the status of Member State national fell far short of fulfilling 
the basic condition of equality necessary to sustain a polity. No harmonisation existed regarding 
the rights of individuals to vote in local and European elections in a Member State other than their 
own before 1992. Furthermore, before the Council Act of 197615 by which universal suffrage was 
established for the European Parliament, individuals were not even directly represented in the 
creation of norms in the Union legal order. Even after the change was made to direct election to 
the European Parliament from national parliaments electing representatives, the Act left the 
determination of the definition and scope of voting rights to the Member States. 
 Therefore, an asymmetry existed between the incipient citizen of the European Union as 
a passive beneficiary and object of the legal rights that would facilitate their instrumental 
integration into other societies, and the incipient citizen as the active political subject with control 
over the destiny of how these legal norms are formulated and applied. The approaches to the 
creation of a holistic status of citizenship of the Union that would address this asymmetry may be 
categorised according to whether they advocated citizenship as an incremental agglomeration of 
the pre-existing legal and political benefits accruing to nationals of the Member States,16 or whether 
they emphasised the creation of citizenship anew as an autonomous status.17 The final shape of 
the status in the Treaty of Maastricht may be regarded as a compromise between these two 
positions. This will be explicated in the section below. The nature of this compromise can help to 
explain how the academic reaction to citizenship changed drastically from initial sceptical dismissal 
to celebration in the following two eras. 
 
B. The ‘scepticism’ era 
 
Closa divides the constitutionalisation of citizenship of the Union at Maastricht into three parts: a 
definition of the status, the catalogue of rights attached to the condition of citizenship, and a 
                                                 
11 See K Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2015) ch 5. 
12 See, inter alia, Hoekstra v Administration of the Industrial Board for Retail Trades and Businesses, C-75/63  EU: C: 1964: 19; 
Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, C-138/02  EU:C:2004:172. 
13 Council Directive (EEC) No 90/364 on the right of residence: [1990] OJ L180/26; Council Directive (EEC) No 
90/65 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased occupational activity 
[1990] OJ L189/17; Council Directive (EEC) No 90/36 on right of residence for students: [1990] OJ L180/30. 
14 Article 1 of Council Directive (EEC) No 90/364:[1990] OJ L180/26.  
15 Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage OJ L278/5. 
16 The position of the Dublin European Council of 1990, see note 7 above, p 1154: ‘[The European Council] 
endorsed the development of the concept from the limited form of citizenship already existing within the EC and 
not created ex novo’. 
17 The position of the Spanish delegation, see ibid: ‘the creation of a new instance of political power, i.e the Union, 
would require the definition of rights and duties of the affected individuals, as happens in national states’. 
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procedure for future development of this Part of the Treaty.18 The substance of this tripartite 
division is now incorporated in Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU. Article 8(1) of the Treaty of 
Maastricht declared that: ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’. Predication upon nationality of 
a Member State means that no direct connection was created between the individual and the 
European Union constitutional order. Instead, the Member States remained the interface for the 
acquisition and functioning of the status. Thus, this passive acquisition may be regarded as a grand 
gesture of inclusion of all Member State nationals under one status. However, in addition to 
strengthening the second-class status of Third Country Nationals,19 this inclusive move may also 
be argued to have led to the perceived exclusion of those individuals who rely on their Member 
State nationality as their fundamental status for the pursuit of fulfilment. It may be suggested that 
such individuals perceived their passive acquisition of EU citizenship and its consequent 
development as detrimental to rather than empowering of their own capacity for political self-
determination. This is exacerbated by the fact that the rights created by citizenship focused on free 
movement and the political rights to vote in local and European elections to enable the integration 
of mobile individuals, thus weighing the substance of citizenship against those individuals who do 
not exercise these rights. 
 The catalogue of the rights that constitute the substance of citizenship are the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;20 the right to vote and to stand 
as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in the Member 
State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of the State;21 the right to enjoy, in the 
territory of a third country in which the individual’s Member State is not represented, the 
protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions 
as the nationals of that State;22 and the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the 
European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any 
of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language.23 
 On an initial reading of the prima facie content of these rights, it may be argued that the 
new status was successful in eliminating the divergences in the treatment of nationals of the 
Member States in both the political input and the legal output dimensions. The integration rights 
that individuals may rely upon in the territories of other Member States are no longer explicitly 
limited to certain sub-categories, but are linked to the holistic condition of citizen. Furthermore, 
the rights of participation in European and local elections have been explicitly made subject to 
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, thus instituting a bare minimum level of equality of 
treatment as a political subject. The capacity to rely upon the consular protection of another 
Member State whilst outside the territory of the Union on the same condition as national citizens 
can be seen as providing a unified external face to the Union’s political and legal community, thus 
defining the inclusion of all Member State nationals. It is telling, however, that the right is only 
applicable when the EU citizen’s home state does not have a consulate, thus emphasising the 
                                                 
18 ibid, p 1157. 
19 On the ‘citizenship-foreigner cleavage’ see D Thym, ‘Ambiguities of Personhood, Citizenship, Migration and 
Fundamental Rights in EU Law’ in L Azoulai, S Barbou des Places and E Pataut (eds), Constructing the Person in EU 
Law: Rights, Roles, Identities (Hart Publishing, 2016) . 
20 Article 20(2)(a) and Article 21 TFEU. 
21 Article 20(2)(b) and  Article 22 TFEU. 
22 Article 20(2)(c) and Article 23 TFEU 
23 Article 20(d) and Article 24 TFEU 
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primacy of the national bond and confirming the residual and supplementary nature of the benefits 
of EU citizenship. The right to petition the ombudsman and the European Parliament, which was 
born out of a desire to provide direct administrative routes for enforcing the rights of citizenship, 
can be understood as bolstering the status of EU citizens as objects and beneficiaries of EU law. 
It has been argued that these petition rights are superfluous as citizenship rights as they are 
duplicated and explicitly outlined as being enjoyable by ‘any person’ in what are now Articles 227 
and 228 TFEU.24 Although it is true that the text of Article 24 TFEU mirrors these provisions, 
the key added benefit seems to be that every citizen may write and receive a reply in one of the 
language outlined in Article 55(1) TEU: this citizenship right could therefore be reconstructed as 
a right to linguistic diversity. This re-emphasises the purpose of providing a basic minimum of 
equality within the input and output sides of norm formulation for all individuals holding the status 
of citizen through the elimination of the administrative burdens that may arise from the plurality 
of languages within the European Union. 
 However, it is important to note that the scope of these rights is subject to conditions. It 
may be argued that the equality of EU citizens is a rebuttable presumption. Article 20 outlines that 
the rights shall be exercised ‘in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties 
and by the measures adopted thereunder’. As will be seen, the secondary legislation which would 
implement the free movement rights of Union citizenship continued to preserve the cleavages 
along economic lines between Union citizens. This manifest itself in the qualitative and 
quantitative conditions imposed upon different categories of individuals. Furthermore, Article 
22(1) details that the rights to vote and stand in local and European elections are subject to the 
possibility of derogation where ‘warranted by problems specific to a Member States’. The capacity 
for the Union legislative process to impose limitations upon citizenship rights challenges the 
perspective that the status provides for legal and political equality between all European citizens. 
For this reason, the manner in which citizenship of the European Union was brought into 
existence was greeted by a sceptical reaction from academics, who emphasised the partial and 
deficient nature of the status. 
 Joseph Weiler provides a paradigmatically sceptical account, proposing that ‘the 
Citizenship clause in the TEU is little more than a cynical exercise in public relations…[more] 
noteworthy by what it does not do that what it does’.25 Weiler confronts the specific legal 
integration rights created by the status, arguing that the rights are limited to individuals ‘not in 
their capacity as human beings, let alone citizens, but in their capacity as factors of production’.26 
The crux of Weiler’s criticism is that positive law rights are insufficient to generate the thick 
normative conception of citizenship as belonging to a holistic collective detached from the 
economic productivity of the constituent individuals thereof. In attempting to create the state of 
consciousness and self-understanding of citizenship through law in the Treaty of Maastricht, it 
may be argued that the European Union placed the cart before the horse. Hans Ulrich Jessun 
d’Oliveira provides another famous soundbite: ‘[Union] citizenship is…almost exclusively a 
                                                 
24 D Kochenov and M Van den Brink, ‘Pretending There is No Union: Non-derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rights of 
Third Country Nationals in the EU’ in D Thym and M Zoeteweij-Turhan (eds), Rights of Third Country Nationals under 
EU Association Agreements (Brill Nijhoff, 2015)   
25 J Weiler, ‘Introduction’ in Massimo La Torre (ed), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (Springer, 1998), p 
13. 
26 ibid, 13. 
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symbolic plaything without substantive content’.27 Jessun d’Oliveira’s critique focuses more on the 
underdeveloped political dimension of citizenship.28 He argues that the crystallisation of the notion 
of Union citizenship around free movement stands in contrast to the historical development of 
citizenship as accruing around the political rights of the individual.29 In addition to the limited 
scope of rights, a defining feature of Union citizenship is the absence of duties, despite mention 
being made of this in Article 20(2).30 Weiler assesses this phenomenon thus: ‘rights are surely 
important, but in the classic discourse of citizenship surely duties, the things the polity asks of its 
members, are as critical as that which it gives them’.31 The dismissal of European Union 
citizenship’s birth at Maastricht by these scholars, amongst others, may be connected to their 
normative position32 that citizenship should provide for a means of political belonging beyond the 
nation-state. The connection between such ‘maximal’ conceptions of citizenship and reactions to 
its development will be explored further in section III. 
 
C. The ‘destiny’ era 
 
Carlos Closa finishes his initial 1992 survey of the concept of citizenship with consideration of its 
future potential. He argues that what is now Article 25 TFEU provided a solid basis for the further 
enlargement of the catalogue of rights attached to citizenship, and that ‘[t]he institutional role for 
the development of the dynamic character of citizenship will be the determinant factor to produce 
a qualitative leap forward’.33 However, rather that this institutional development occurring through 
the political means envisaged in Article 25 TFEU, the next era in the development of citizenship 
would instead be driven by the progressive adjudication of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. The (in)famous dicta from 2001 that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member State’34  would come to be the mission statement for the 
aspirational nature of Union citizenship. This would prove to be the telos by which the Court of 
Justice would orientate its interpretation of primary and secondary law in this period.  
 A preliminary observation pertains to the discrepancy in the volume of litigation and 
legislation between the free movement rights contained in Article 20(2)(a) TFEU, and the political 
rights contained within Article 20(2)(b) TFEU. The cases surveyed below arise exclusively from 
the exercise of the former right to move and reside freely. With regard to the right to vote and 
stand as candidates in local and European Parliamentary elections, the only case that may be 
regarded as ‘major’ is the Matthews35 case brought before the European Court of Human Rights on 
the enfranchisement of citizens of the UK overseas territory of Gibraltar, which culminated in an 
                                                 
27 J d’Oliveira, ‘Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?’ in Rosas and Antola (eds), ‘A Citizen’s Europe: In Search of a 
New Order’ (Sage Publications, 1995), p 82. 
28 ibid, p 83. 
29 ibid. 
30 ‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties’. Article 20(2) 
TFEU. However, no such duties are derived from the Treaties. 
31 See note 25 above, p 14. 
32 Weiler argues that ‘there is…immense promise…[for]…a demos understood in non-organic civic terms’, ibid, p 
16. Similarly, d’Oliveira argues that ‘European citizenship may be useful as a laboratory for this procedural concept 
of proto-cosmopolitan citizenship’ in J d’Oliveira, ‘European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its Potential’ in R Dehousse 
(ed), ‘Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?’ (Springer, 1994).  
33 See note 7 above, p 1168. 
34 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, C-184/99, EU:C:2001:458. 
35 Matthews v United Kingdom, (Application no. 24833/94) (1999) 28 EHRR 361. 
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Article 258 TFEU infringement being brought by Spain against the United Kingdom.36  In terms 
of secondary legislation, the political rights in sub-section (b) are implemented by a 1994 directive. 
By contrast to the legislation implementing the sub-section (a) rights – discussed below – this 
directive has not been reformed nor updated in nearly a quarter of a century.37 Tentatively, one 
may infer from these litigative and legislative phenomena that individuals regard their rights to 
establish themselves within the society of another Member State as more important to their self-
fulfilment than their right to exercise their political self-determination in the election of local and 
European representatives. Simply stated, individuals appear to care more about the legal ‘output’ 
than their political ‘input’ with regard to these norms. This poses questions regarding the extent 
to which mobile EU citizens in fact rely upon public institutions and representatives as opposed 
to professional and social institutions in their pursuit of life-plans throughout Europe. The answer 
to such questions lies outside the ambit of the argument in this piece and requires detailed social 
scientific research. Such extensive consideration of the exercise of the political rights granted by 
EU citizenship is currently the subject of academic and civil society projects partly funded by the 
European institutions.38 
 Alexander Somek has criticised this dictum of EU citizenship being a fundamental status 
from a formalistic perspective: ‘[the statement] appears in a ruling, without explicit and 
unequivocal anchor in the Treaty’.39 The charge seems to be that the Court of Justice has not 
adhered sufficiently to the ‘sources thesis’40 of legal positivism in its application of the legal norms 
concerning citizenship of the Union. However, a more charitable approach would recognise that 
the Court of Justice was faced with an internal plurality of sources that it had to deal with in the 
cases brought by individuals seeking to rely upon their citizenship rights. As noted above, the 
implementation of the rights found in Article 20 TFEU is made conditional upon secondary 
legislation. However, before the consolidating efforts of the 2004 ‘Citizen’s Directive’41 the most 
contemporaneous secondary legislation fulfilling this criterion were the pre-Maastricht Directives 
on the rights of students and pensioners. The right of residence was dependent upon the national 
issuance of a residence permit with host Member State discretion to limit the right to reside to 5 
years on a renewable basis, with a capacity to require revalidation of residence after 2 years.42 Such 
difference of treatment on the basis of nationality may be regarded as incompatible with the 
statement of the first clause of Article 21(1) TFEU: ‘Every citizen shall have the right to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. This raises the theoretical issue of whether 
an application by the Court of Justice of secondary legislation may be regarded as ‘unconstitutional’ 
in the sense that the secondary legislation undermines provisions of primary Treaty law 
promulgated thereafter. Space precludes a more detailed examination of this pertinent 
constitutional issue. However, one may conclude that the Court’s subsequent case law confirms 
that the reliance of Member States upon restrictions and exemptions mandated by secondary 
                                                 
36 Spain v the United Kingdom (Gibraltar), C-145/04,  EU:C:2006:543. 
37 Council Directive (EC) No 94/80 on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in municipal elections: [1994] OJ L368/38. 
38 https://faireu.ecas.org. 
39 A Somek, ‘Is Legality a Principle of EU Law?’  
<http://www.academia.edu/24524007/Is_legality_a_principle_of_EU_law> .  
40 See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/. 
41 Council and European Parliament Directive (EC) No 2004/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States: [2004] OJ L158/77. 
42 Council Directive (EEC) No 90/364 on the right of residence: [1990] OJ L 180/26.   
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legislation must be in conformity with the fundamental principles of the Union’s constitutional 
order. 
 This may be forwarded as the reason why the Court of Justice saw fit in the case of 
Baumbast to find that the rights granted in the Treaty are ‘autonomous’ of secondary provisions 
and directly effective for individuals.43 In interpreting whether the applicant’s lack of sickness 
insurance under Directive 90/364 disqualified him from the right of residence, the Court clarified 
that although the exercise of the Treaty rights is indeed subject to limitations and conditions, ‘the 
competent authorities and…the national courts must ensure that those limitations and conditions 
are applied in compliance with the general principles of Community law and, in particular, the 
principle of proportionality’.44 Thus, these cases may be regarded as an emancipatory45 move by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union to establish an autonomous concept of citizenship of 
the European Union as a status of equality. This would then enable the Court to decide the cases 
brought to it by individuals. As will be discussed in relation to the next era, when secondary 
legislation was explicitly created to establish the conditions for the exercise of citizenship rights in 
2004, it may be argued that this created incoherence between the sources of the Court’s case-law 
and secondary-law promulgated by the Union’s legislature. This may be pinned upon the EU legal 
order’s undefined hierarchy of sources. Consequently, it may be proposed that the academic 
disquiet and claims of regression regarding recent cases is the result of the Court’s movement away 
from its earlier emancipatory jurisprudence towards coherent alignment with the secondary 
legislation. 
 The ‘destiny’ dicta may be interpreted in either a minimal or a maximal manner. Under the 
former reading, EU citizenship as a ‘fundamental status’ may only refer to the status of nationals 
of the Member State when their situation falls under the scope of EU law. In accordance with 
Baumbast, therefore, the status of citizenship remains the vessel through which Member State 
nationals derive rights in EU law, with the sub-categories of secondary legislation remaining sub-
ordinate and explicitly subject to the general principles of the Union legal order. A far more radical 
and maximal reading of the Court’s claim in Rudy Grzelczyk is that citizenship of the Union will 
become the fundamental status for all nationals of the Member States even outside the scope of EU 
law. An alternative interpretation is that the Court extended the material scope of EU law in order 
to encapsulate such factual situations.46  
 Such a reading may be supported by the dicta in Ruiz Zambrano that ‘Article 20 TFEU 
precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of 
the Union’.47  This led to the decision in the case that citizenship rights of residence are extended 
to those who do not fulfil the conditions for EU citizenship of nationality of a Member States. 
Perhaps most strikingly, in the Rottmann48 case the same logic was utilised to establish that 
citizenship of the Union may not only be the destiny of Member State nationals, but also a residual 
safety-net which may operate to preserve the EU law rights of individuals in cases of the 
                                                 
43 Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-413/99, EU:C:2002:493, paragraph 94. 
44 ibid.  
45 See A Somek, ‘The Emancipation of Legal Dissonance’ (Social Science Research Network 2009) SSRN Scholarly 
Paper ID 1333194 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1333194> .  
46 I thank Martijn van den Brink for this point. 
47 Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi, C-34/09, EU:C:2011:124,paragraph 42. 
48 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, C-135/08, EU:C:2010:104. 
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disproportionate revocation of their nationality. This seems to extend the ambit of citizenship of 
the Union into the realm of providing a check upon the national sovereignty to determine who 
the constituent subjects of the state are. The precedent established in the Rotmann case was relied 
upon by the litigants in the ‘Amsterdam Case’ in support of their argument for the ultimate 
emancipation of the existence – or at least the retention – of EU citizenship from the condition 
of nationality of a Member State.49 This maximal interpretation of the Court’s statement regarding 
the telos of citizenship has informed the academic opinion that this era may not only have 
substantiated Article 20 TFEU, but that it has even contributed to a transformation of the concept 
of citizenship in the abstract. This is perhaps evidenced most strongly in Dora Kostakopoulou’s 
evocation of ‘constructive citizenship’,50 a maximal academic position on citizenship of the Union 
that will be analysed in Section III below. 
 
D. The ‘regression’ era 
 
In 2014 and 2015 respectively, the Court of Justice delivered its judgments in the Dano51 and 
Alimanovic52 cases. Dion Kramer has argued that these cases taken together constitute a reversal of 
the Court of Justice’s approach on claims of social assistance by EU citizens.53 The case law in the 
‘destiny era’ had emphasised that those who find themselves in the same situation enjoy, in 
principle, the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality. In the case-law which may be 
regarded as initiating the ‘regression’ era, however, the Court of Justice has climbed down with 
regard to access to social benefits. It has outlined that a Union citizen can claim equal treatment 
only on the condition that residence in the territory of the host Member State complies with the 
conditions for lawful residence as established in the Citizen’s Directive.54 The judgment may be 
regarded as a new cautious approach from the Court of Justice. This displays greater deference to 
the outcome of the democratic process found in EU secondary legislation rather than relying upon 
the inferred telos of the primary law. This is evidenced by the fact that in Alimanovic the Court 
departs from its previous Brey55 judgment by stating that a proportionality test in the form of an 
individual assessment of the individual is not required. Furthermore, in Alimanovic, the right of 
residence of the mother was assessed on the basis of her purely being a ‘job-seeker’ under Article 
14(4) of the 2004 Directive. Therefore, the judgments may be regarded as a regression back to 
earlier eras of assessing the entitlements of individuals on the basis of the various sub-categories 
that they fall under as prescribed by secondary legislation, rather than through a holistic view of 
the concept and purpose of the status of Union citizenship.  
 Although the judgments may be praised for encouraging legal certainty by deferring to the 
quantitative and qualitative conditions outlined for entitlement to national social assistance in the 
implementing legislation, they are more problematic on the basis that the Court’s formerly 
expansive reading of the status and its entitlements has created expectations in the practice of 
individuals. The problem may be framed as one of internal norms pluralism: the precedents 
                                                 
49 See note 5 above, paragraph 5.7. 
50 D Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ (2007) 13 (5) European Law Journal 623. 
51 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, C-333/13, EU:C:2014:2358. 
52 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others, C-67/14, EU:C:2015:597. 
53 http://europeanlawblog.eu/2015/09/29/had-they-only-worked-one-month-longer-an-analysis-of-the-alimanovic-
case-2015-c-6714/ . 
54 ibid. 
55 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, C-140/12, EU:C:2013:565. 
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established by the Court and the conditions established by the legislature stand in ostensible 
conflict. This creates uncertainty for individuals as to what norms they may be able to rely on in 
their pursuit of life plans. This is exacerbated by the drafting of the Citizen’s Directive, and the 
apparent inconsistency between the conditions for residence and the conditions for access to social 
assistance. On this basis, the judgments in Dano and Alimanovic have been criticised vociferously 
on the basis that they are liable to create injustice for individuals, in addition to undermining the 
concept of Union citizenship as a status of basic political and legal equality.   
 Floris de Witte makes the strong argument that the judgments ‘legally mandate the creation 
of a European underclass of vulnerable citizens who, because of this exercise of free movement, are neither 
politically represented nor materially protected from the most egregious forms of exclusion’.56 
Daniel Thym argues that the reason for this is the lack of a ‘thick’ conception of social justice at 
the European level. The status of economically inactive citizens ‘transcends the single market and 
emanates directly from the rights attached to Union citizenship, their reach has never been subject 
to principled political consensus’.57 The strongest claim that such a phenomenon is indicative of a 
regression in the concept of citizenship of the Union is provided by Charlotte O’Brien. She claims 
that ‘welfare nationalism is washing away the traces of EU citizenship, with decreasing resistance 
from the Court of Justice’.58 O’Brien claims that the Citizen’s Directive has been redefined in this 
era from an expression of rights to an expression of limitations protecting Member States’ welfare 
systems.59 She claims that Commission v UK60 has extended this reconceptualization to the other 
implementing secondary legislation including Regulation 883/2004 on the co-ordination of social 
security systems.61 O’Brien therefore argues that a new fundamental principle of benefit restriction 
has been created that is now read in to the implementing legislation on citizenship.62 This signifies 
a complete reversal from secondary legislation being interpreted in accordance with the perceived 
telos that the status and its attendant entitlements is destined to be fundamental for Member State 
nationals. 
The academic consensus on the regression era of the Court of Justice’s case law on EU 
citizenship is that although it is methodologically legitimate, the reduced activism on the part of 
the Court in the application of norms has undermined the potential for the status to promote 
equality between all Member State nationals. It can be inferred that, as a result of popular push-
back against European integration, the balance between nationals of the Member State and citizens 
of the Union has been reset. Greater deference is exercised towards unilateral Member State 
determinations of entitlement on the basis of interpretations of secondary legislation which are 
held valid by the Court of Justice. There has been some attempt by the Advocate Generals to 
resuscitate the destiny telos of citizenship in recent cases which have confirmed the decisions on 
derived rights of third country national parents.63 However, the regression era may be evidence 
that the limits of the extent to which the Court of Justice as a norm-applying body may define the 
                                                 
56 F de Witte, ‘Freedom of movement under attack’ in note 8 above, p 3. 
57 D Thym, ‘The failure of Union citizenship beyond the single market’ in ibid, p 7. 
58 C O’Brien, ‘Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights’ (2016) 53 (4) 
Common Market Law Review 937, p 937. 
59 Ibid, p 939. 
60 Commission v United Kingdom, Case C-308/14, EU:C:2016:436. 
61 Council and European Parliament Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems: 
[2004] OJ L166/1. 
62 See note 58 above, p 951. 
63 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Alfedro Rendon Marin v Administracion del Estado, C-304/15, 
EU:C:2016:75, points 107-110. 
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contours of the concept of citizenship of the Union have been reached. The litmus test for such a 
proposition would be the Luxembourg court’s response to being asked in preliminary reference to 
answer the question of whether one must remain a national of a Member State to remain a citizen 
of the Union. However, following the decision on appeal by the judge in the Amsterdam District 
Court not to refer this question to the Court of Justice,64 the answer remains hypothetical at the 
present moment. As opposed to a judicial pronouncement thereupon, it may be argued that to 
constitute European citizenship as a true status of belonging a display of popular legitimation is 
required. This may be necessary to ensure that the status is not entirely hollowed out by challenges 
to European integration.                                                                                                    
 The necessity of such a radical move has been brought sharply into focus by the United 
Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the European Union. For the first time in the history of 
citizenship of the Union the uneasy foundations of the status being predicated upon nationality of 
Member States have been exposed. The retention of the sovereignty of these states to withdraw 
from the Treaties means that individuals may be deprived of the status of citizenship of the Union 
against their will. Tentative academic arguments have been proposed as to how the Rottmann case 
law could be used to preserve the rights and status of citizens after the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal.65 These arguments have manifested themselves in the pleadings of the claimants in the 
‘Amsterdam Case’.66 However, these arguments seem to rely on a conception of citizenship that is 
not supported by the positive law of the Treaties. Article 20(1) TFEU makes clear that a necessary 
condition for the acquisition of citizenship of the Union is nationality of a Member State. Article 
50(3) TEU explicitly provides that the Treaties shall cease to apply to the State which has decided 
to withdraw from the Union. Thus, the nationals of that state will no longer fulfil the condition of 
nationality of a Member States, and instead their status will convert to that of third country 
nationals.67 This is confirmed by the European Council’s withdrawal negotiation guidelines. 
Furthermore, the guidelines’ claim that ‘a future relationship between the Union and the United 
Kingdom as such can only be finalised and concluded once the United Kingdom has become a 
third country’68 seems to preclude the possibility of an arrangement being made to retain the status 
of citizenship of the Union for UK nationals before they lose it. The present draft of the 
Withdrawal Treaty whereby the United Kingdom will fulfil the conditions of Article 50(3) TEU 
preserves the disparate free movement rights of UK citizens that were created by Article 20(2)(a) 
TFEU. 69 However, it does not preserve the status of citizenship created by Article 20(1) TFEU as 
the holistic silo thereof.  At both the micro-level of individual cases and the macro-level of an 
entire state polity, it may be concluded that the regressive era of citizenship has shed doubt upon 
the essence, existence, and value of citizenship of the Union. In order to propose a solution to this 
                                                 
64See note 6 above. 
65 P Mindus, European Citizenship after Brexit (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). See also Gareth Davies’ argument for why 
Rottmann is inapplicable to the consequences of Brexit  https://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/07/07/union-citizenship-
still-europeans-destiny-after-brexit/. 
66 See note 5 above. 
67 However, for the alternative teleological argument that these positive sources may establish the condition for the 
acquisition of EU citizenship but that they do not necessarily establish the condition for the loss or retention thereof see 
note 5 above. 
68 < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/. 
69 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-withdrawal-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-
great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community_en. 
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existential crisis, it is necessary first to outline the normative positions on what the status should 
mean for individuals. 
III. ‘MAXIMAL’ AND ‘MINIMAL’ CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION: 
A FUNDAMENTAL OR SUPPLEMENTARY STATUS? 
As hinted at in the preceding section, much of the academic praise or criticism of the Court of 
Justice’s development of the status and rights of citizenship of the Union is implicitly predicated 
upon an author’s normative political theoretical conception of what the status should represent. 
Through a reductive dichotomy, ‘maximal’ conceptions of citizenship may be regarded as taking a 
cosmopolitan approach that emphasises the possibility of political belonging and self- and 
collective-determination beyond the boundaries of the nation state. By contrast, ‘minimal’ 
conceptions of citizenship take a predominantly statist approach, and emphasise that the 
conditions for constitutional democracy can still only be fulfilled at the national level. Therefore, 
they argue that the ambit of citizenship of the Union should remain limited to a supplementary 
status to enable the targeted integration of individuals into other national polities for specifically 
defined purposes. These two positions can be roughly matched to the two potential roads that 
citizenship could have taken during the Intergovernmental Conference before Maastricht: a de novo 
fundamental political status, or an incremental agglomeration of pre-existing Treaty rights.    
 My argument will be that both positions are reductive insofar as they assume that 
citizenship of the Union can have a uniform meaning and significance for all nationals of the 
Member States. Instead, it is submitted that the 500 million citizens of Europe are differentiated 
along a graduated spectrum by their attitude towards whether the pursuit of their life-plans are 
predicated upon engagement with their European citizenship or limited to their national 
citizenship. Explicit recognition of this cleavage would allow for a concept of citizenship as an 
autonomous status which individuals can choose to undertake, thus providing them with the 
benefit of the pre-existing rights of free movement and political representation, but also putative 
future social and political rights and duties that are currently absent. The contours of this proposed 
autonomous status will be traced in Section IV below. 
A. ‘Maximal’ conceptions of citizenship of the Union 
Jürgen Habermas’ arguments regarding European citizenship are a starting point for considering 
the ‘maximal’ position. Indeed, Habermas’ view may be seen as the ultimate elaboration of a 
maximal or expansionist conception of citizenship due to his perception that a ‘European 
constitutional patriotism’ would be a staging post on the continuum between state citizenship and 
world citizenship.70 However, Habermas perceives that a crucial prerequisite for such a 
convergence depends on the catalytic effect of a constitution in order to foster the civil society 
required to sustain democratic constitutional culture at the European level.71 In his latest treatise 
on European constitutionalisation,72 Habermas has outlined how individuals would be ‘dual-
constituent subjects’ in their role both as citizens of the Union and nationals of the Member State. 
This would ensure that the constitutional states do not lose their freedom-guaranteeing function 
for constituent national subjects. In the final section of this paper, the argument will be made that 
                                                 
70 J Habermas, ‘Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of Europe’ (1990) 12 (1) Praxis 
International 1 
71 J Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’ (2001) 11 New Left Review 5. 
72 J Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity Press, 2013). 
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such a dual-constituent role could only be achieved through the active choice of those individuals 
who would be the subjects of the new European constitutional order.    
 The academic positions detailed in the previous sections that were critical of citizenship of 
the Union in the sceptical and regression eras, and positive in the fundamental status era, also 
exhibit elements of Habermasian post-national cosmopolitanism. In addition to the position taken 
by Weiler and Jessun d’Oliveira that citizenship of the Union could beckon a new form of civic 
cosmopolitan belonging, Vincenzo Lippolis argues that ‘European citizenship ought to be 
perceived…as the foundation of a deeper sense of European Unity, of Europe as an evolving 
‘polis’ capable of meeting the needs of the human community upon which it rests’.73 The familial 
resemblance that connects these arguments is the perception that it is both possible in practice 
and desirable in theory for individuals to exercise their existential capacity for political self-
determination and individual and collective self-fulfilment beyond the boundaries of the 
Westphalian nation-state.         
 The strongest endorsement of the maximal position is provided by Kostakopoulou’s 
conception of ‘constructive citizenship’. She endorses the phenomenon whereby ‘the boundaries 
of national citizenship have not been relaxed ‘from within’ as to allow Community [Union] 
nationals to obtain citizenship via naturalisation, but they have been ‘ruptured from outside’ 
through the conferral of rights which are enforceable before national courts.74 She claims that this 
inclusiveness enlarges the social content of citizenship without undermining national social 
solidarity and means of redistribution,75 and concludes her analysis with an alternative conception 
of citizenship as a ‘network good’: ‘Individuals are thus no longer locked with a single, unified and 
finite network commanding unqualified allegiance. Rather they are members of and participants 
in multiple associative networks to which rights and obligations are attached’.76 Therefore, it is 
precisely the fact that European citizenship is not a finished artefact, but has a content that is 
flexible and dynamic that provides its primary normative appeal.77 This enables Kostakopolou to 
forward proposals as to how citizenship of the Union should be extended further. She argues that 
residence should be the new signifier of political belonging thus enabling third country nationals 
to gain European citizenship after five years.78 Furthermore, she advocates enfranchising mobile 
citizens of the Union within their host Member State demoi for national general elections.79 This 
would effectively collapse the operative distinction and balancing required between Member State 
nationality and citizenship of the Union in the ‘dual constituent’ process, and instead make 
citizenship of the Union the primary status of political and social belonging.   
 In addition to maximal positions developing in response to the Court of Justice’s 
fundamental destiny dicta, such positions are also evident in the reaction against the perceived 
regression of the Court’s case law in recent years. Floris de Witte’s aforementioned critique that 
the Dano and Alimanovic cases mandate the creation of a European underclass may at a higher level 
of abstraction be regarded as criticism of the status of citizenship of the Union itself.80 The 
perception is that the status is partial and exclusionary of certain strata of society rather than being 
                                                 
73 V Lippolis, ‘European Citizenship: what is it and what it could be’ in note 25 above, p 325. 
74 See note 50 above, p 643. 
75 ibid, p 641. 
76 ibid, p 645. 
77 ibid, p 638. 
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maximally and optimally inclusive. For Article 20 TFEU has always been subject to the 
conditionality which was eventually implemented by, inter alia, the Citizen’s Directive, and 
therefore the argument that the Court should have continued with a constructive role in mitigating 
possible injustice would seem to contradict the clear wording of the primary and secondary law. 
Similarly to Daniel Thym, de Witte seems to suggest that the status of citizenship of the Union 
should provide for a sufficiently thick form of solidarity in order to enable the realisation of social 
justice.           
 Maximal approaches to citizenship of the Union, however, may be subject to the charge 
that they assess the status according to a particular conception of its normative potential rather 
than the manifestation thereof in reality. Notwithstanding the aspirational dicta and creativity of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, on a qualitative level the status was born as and 
remains a disparate selection of economic and political rights the substance of which only becomes 
salient once a national of a Member State moves across borders. On a quantitative level, the 
consideration that the status could become fundamental to all nationals of the 27 Member States 
may be regarded as unviable in practice, as evidenced by the very small percentage of Union 
citizens that make use of their free movement rights. O’Brien provides a sceptical note along these 
lines: ‘[T]he great promise of EU citizenship had only ever really taken hold in the ivory towers of 
academic imagination and the ECJ’.81       
 This may also inform a critique of the normative desirability of the iterative construction 
of an apparently fundamental status through ex post facto judicial construction. Although such a 
process may provide exciting innovations for legal academics, for the ordinary individuals who are 
the holders of these rights such shifting sands are detrimental to the certainty they require in order 
to pursue their plans for self- and collective-fulfilment outside of their home Member State. This 
is captured by Gareth Davies’ observation that welfare states in Europe are harmonised by 
‘principles developed reactively, inductively, and out of individual situations, by the Court of 
Justice’ rather than through policy making in the political arena.82 From the perspective of 
democratic input legitimacy, the current manifestation of citizenship may be regarded as 
disempowering both for the national solidarity of host Member States and for the mobile citizen 
of the Union. For the former, the claims of Union citizens to social benefits and social assistance 
are parasitic upon the thick social solidarity which underpins the democratic procedures by which 
systems of redistribution are generated and maintained. For the latter, the disempowerment arises 
from the fact that these mobile individuals have no means of contributing to this democratic will 
formation in their host Member State. This is because citizenship of the Union does not provide 
for voting rights in national general elections. Therefore, their only means of self-determination in 
ensuring their rights as citizens of the Union is through litigation after the democratic process has 
culminated in national legislation.         
 Citizens of the Union who exercise their free movement rights can be argued to fall into 
the no-man’s land between the social solidarity which sustains their host Member State and their 
home Member State in the current construction of citizenship of the Union. In the host state, the 
resources that they require in order to integrate will only ever be parasitic upon national democratic 
and welfare regimes. In their home state they are no longer physically present and participating in 
                                                 
81 See note 58 above, p 974. 
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the life-world of society, and even though they may still be entitled to vote in national elections 
and also claim social assistance in the first three months after moving to another Member State, 
these resources may not be sufficiently tailored to conditions in their new home society.83
 Therefore, it is concluded that the maximal normative conception of citizenship of the 
Union as a fundamental status of political and social belonging beyond the constitutional orders 
of the Member States is not supported by the reality of its current manifestation. The fact that 
citizens of the Union are only ever able to rely upon the solidarity mechanisms of either their home 
Member State or their host Member State could lead one to conclude that citizenship of the Union 
does not and is not intended to provide an existential status of belonging for individuals.84 The 
argument may be made that Europe is no homeland – instead, the role of citizenship of the Union 
is limited to enabling the tailored coordination between national polities in assuring the welfare 
and capacity for self-fulfilment of those who fulfil the conditions to acquire citizenship of the 
Union.85 This present reality may inform and consequently be justified by a normative position 
which emphasises the democratic nation state as the continuing basic unit of political belonging 
and individual and collective self-determination. This contrary conception may be regarded as the 
resemblance binding the ‘minimal’ conceptions of citizenship of the Union. 
B. ‘Minimal’ conceptions of citizenship of the Union 
Even before the Treaty of Maastricht came into force, the new status had received a minimalist 
interpretation by the German Constitutional Court: ‘The common Union citizenship established 
by the Maastricht Treaty forms a legal bond between the citizens of the individual Member States 
which is designed to be lasting; it is not characterised by an intensity comparable to that which 
follows from common membership in a single State’.86 This dicta was subsequently strengthened 
in the case concerning ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon: ‘The concept of the ‘citizen of the 
Union’…is exclusively founded on Treaty law. The citizenship of the Union is solely derived from 
the will of the Member States and does not constitute a people of the Union, which would be 
competent to exercise self-determination as a legal entity giving itself a constitution’.87 This 
minimal conception of the Union’s constitutional order and the place of citizenship within it has 
been further elaborated in the academic work of the former justice of the German Constitutional 
Court Dieter Grimm. He asserts that the European Parliament does not constitute a European 
popular representative body ‘since there is as yet no European people’.88 Therefore, these views 
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limit the scope of citizenship to realising the goals of the Treaties establishing the European Union 
as a basis for cooperation between the peoples of sovereign Member States.  
 Richard Bellamy’s neo-Republican normative political theory also provides a sceptical 
perspective on the notion of European identity and belonging. ‘Support for the EU is largely 
mediated through its being beneficial for national, regional and other interests rather than because 
of a straightforward allegiance to the European idea’.89 This informs Bellamy’s minimal conception 
of citizenship of the Union. Although in his aforementioned piece Bellamy praises the 
development of a form of active citizenship practice in Europe,90 it may be argued that the value 
of this is purely instrumental to achieving the Republican goal of non-domination and coercion at 
the national level. As such, Bellamy has subsequently argued that the most sociologically plausible 
and normatively acceptable role for citizenship of the Union is for it to remain complementary to 
Member State nationality.91          
 Far from the maximalist claims of Kostakopoulou and others, Bellamy advocates this 
position on the basis that the judicial development of the rights of citizenship of the Union have 
undermined rather than enhanced national citizenship. He emphasises the lack of consensus 
among national constitutional regimes on the configuration of civil, political, and social rights and 
the disagreement over the legitimacy of the EU as a source for the enforcement of these rights.92 
Bellamy thus argues that ‘citizens should be able to move and trade freely between member states, 
but the enjoyment of such rights ought to be constrained by the need not to disrupt the rights 
enjoyed by national citizens – not least with regard to access to domestic services’.93 This is 
intimately tied to the conception that the democratic legitimacy of the Union is ‘largely lent to the 
EU through the old forms of democratic citizenship that prevail in the member states’.94 With the 
possibility of such transnational democracy developing at the European level remaining remote, 
Bellamy concludes that ‘European citizenship must continue to remain an adjunct to national 
citizenship’.95           
 A key perceived deficiency that proponents argue necessitates this minimal reading of 
citizenship of the Union is the absence of duties for individuals holding the status. Bellamy 
criticises Dimitry Kochenov’s philosophically anarchist argument for a ‘de-dutification’ of the 
concept of citizenship.96 Bellamy argues that such a conception suggests a ‘thin’ form of EU 
citizenship that allows European citizens to choose which of the Member States they wish to 
become morally obliged to, rather than mandating a ‘thicker’ form of EU level citizenship that 
could only arise by creating civic obligations at the EU level.97 Such a thin conception may be 
argued to co-align with Bellamy’s own minimal political constitutionalist view of citizenship of the 
Union. Insofar, it enables for a nuancing of Bellamy’s normative position. It may be argued that 
Bellamy does not believe a ‘thick’ form of EU citizenship is normatively undesirable per se. 
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However, with regard to its current ‘thin’ form of economic rights that are not tied to the 
obligations of belonging in a political community, it is and would be normatively undesirable for 
citizenship of the Union to provide an alternative to the fundamental status of democratic 
citizenship of the Member States.  Thus, it may be more useful to define this position as a political 
constitutionalist conception of citizenship of the Union as opposed to a minimal conception: insofar 
as the ‘circumstances of citizenship’98 provide the basis for the continuous constitution of 
individuals as members of a political community which enables them to be free from coercion and 
domination, in its current duty-free guise citizenship of the European Union is not appropriate as 
a fundamental status for European individuals.     
 Bellamy’s arguments are framed as critiques of the development of citizenship of the 
Union during the ‘destiny’ era. As opposed to a ‘political constitutionalist’ outlook – which 
emphasis the primary role of representative norm-creation bodies – this case law may be regarded 
as paradigmatic of the school of ‘legal constitutionalism’ that affords primacy within a 
constitutional order to the judicial norm-application bodies.  Bellamy refers to the case law of the 
Court of Justice99 which challenges the Rawlsian ‘natural duty to uphold just institutions’100 in the 
host Member State as corresponding to what has been referred to as ‘juridical nihilism’.101 Minimal 
conceptions of citizenship of the Union have also been espoused as an endorsement of the Court’s 
case-law in the ‘regression’ era. These arguments thus go against the tide of the majority of 
academic opinion. Martijn Van den Brink is explicitly critical of the ‘destiny’ era, and praises the 
subsequent reversal and potential new era of judicial restraint. He claims that ‘if one would have 
claimed in the mid-1990s, shortly after the introduction of EU citizenship, that in 2016 many EU 
lawyers would have serious misgivings about a decision that denies social assistance benefits to 
economically inactive EU citizens with very weak links to the Member State of residence, many 
would have been quite surprised’.102  
This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the outcome of the democratic 
processes which led to the Citizen’s Directive established the basic rule that the economically 
inactive are not entitled under EU law to benefits before they have acquired permanent residence. 
Such will formation is crucial for sensitive issues pertaining to financial solidarity and 
redistribution, and as such Van den Brink questions the consensus whereby the Court of Justice 
is perceived to be the legitimate institution to settle such issues of distributive justice.103 This 
accords with Bellamy’s minimalist arguments that the Court of Justice should not develop 
citizenship of the Union and its attendant entitlements in such a way that it would undermine 
national citizenship and its entitlements. In a similar vein, Rainer Bauböck argues that ‘the battle 
for free movement and European integration is no longer fought primarily in courts where 
individual rights can trump majority preferences; it is increasingly fought in polling stations, 
parliament and the mass media’.104 This can be interpreted as an argument for the limits of the 
Court of Justice in defining the destiny of the status of Union citizenship on the basis of an 
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expansive and maximalist telos. Instead, it is necessary that political consensus is formed on the 
definition and essence of this status. With regard to whom may legitimately participate in the 
formation of such political consensus, Bauböck argues that only those with a ‘genuine link’ to the 
polity in question should be included.105      
 Although the minimal conceptions of citizenship of the Union accurately recognise its 
limited scope in reality, I would assert that they downplay the symbolic and practical significance 
that the status has for many Europeans. Many of these scholars cite the low absolute percentage 
of Europeans who either make practical use of their free movement rights or feel a sense of 
European identity. However, this misses the point that single-figure percentages of more than 500 
million individuals still add up to tens of millions of individuals – much more than the population 
of many modern nation-state polities. Arguably, in the modern world, these individuals are bound 
together by a putative form of solidarity on the basis of their shared practice and experience of 
physically moving beyond their Member State boundaries and attempting to integrate into another 
Member State society. It may be asserted that, through some form of ‘comparative method’ of 
life-practice, these individuals become bound together through a recognition of the convergence 
and divergence of experiences and practices within diverse societies which may ultimately enable 
the identification of a defined set of shared values. Although Habermas’ envisaged European wide 
media communicative networks have not arisen, the rise of social media means that they are not 
necessary – many Europeans are able to establish such communicative networks for themselves 
in order to foster the shared values that are constructed through communicative discourse.  
 The position I adopt is that an incipient polity of Europeans already exists today. However, 
the current institutional design of citizenship of the Union, with its emphasis on tailored economic 
rights that are parasitic on host Member State democratic procedures, means that it is not possible 
for these putative European citizens to constitute themselves into a political community. Thus, 
the final section of this paper will consider the possibility of a middle-point between the maximalist 
and minimalist conceptions of European citizenship. This advocates untethering the status from 
nationality, thus making it a fundamental status of political existence for those who want it to be 
through the exercise of their existential freedom Crucially, however, such a proposal would neither 
disregard the symbolic importance of nor dispense with the practical legal and political 
manifestation of ‘nationality’. Instead, it is proposed that the two concepts of ‘citizenship’ and 
‘nationality’ should be regarded as logically separable. Whereas the former may be regarded as 
variable106 on the basis of the exercise of existential freedom, the latter may be regarded as 
immutable and forming part of one’s ‘facticity’ – the life conditions which cannot be altered and 
thus constrain the exercise of existential freedom. It is suggested that the recognition of such a 
distinction in the context of the European Union could enable the separation in practice of 
Member State nationality and citizenship of the European Union. This would open the door to 
the (re)construction of the latter as autonomous from the former by those who currently hold 
both statuses. 
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IV. AN AUTONOMOUS STATUS AS AN EXPRESSION OF CONSTITUTIVE SELF-
DETERMINATION 
Our response to the intermediate conclusion that citizenship of the European Union does not 
currently embody a fundamental status, but instead a partial entitlement to integration in a host 
Member State, could be to abandon the status all together. In light of the Union’s recent humbled 
reaction to the crises, as embodied in the Commission’s five scenarios for the future of Europe, 
such a response could accord with the scenario whereby the Union is limited to a single market.107 
In this scenario, the paradigm for freedom of movement would regress back to economic activity 
– a condition that the minimalist scholars may argue should never have been breached. However, 
I would argue that when evocative language such as ‘citizenship’ is used, it creates expectations in 
individuals that such a status can indeed be fundamental, holistic, and existential beyond the 
functionality of an internal market. Therefore, despite its current substance falling far short of the 
paradigmatic central cases of citizenship of nation states, to regress back from this language 
explicitly could expose the entire endeavour as the cynical exercise in public relations that Weiler 
warned it might be. The European Union, and the concept of citizenship  by which individuals are 
the subjects and objects of its constitutional order, finds itself on a precipice. It can either retreat 
back to enhanced intergovernmentalism in accordance with the International Law paradigm, or it 
can take a leap of faith into further supranational constitutional innovation. By choosing to give 
substance to the status of citizenship, and most importantly to empower individuals to shape this 
substance, the European Union could provide these people with the existential choice to constitute 
themselves into a new form of polity.         
 The proposal for citizenship of the European Union to become an autonomous status 
would inevitably have to form part of a new constitutional settlement for Europe. Although, as 
Closa notes, Article 25 TFEU envisages the addition of new rights through the political processes 
currently mandated by the Treaties, the proposal here goes far beyond such a piecemeal process 
of reform. Instead it would necessitate a holistic re-imagining of the status. The normative 
foundations for such a constitutional moment are broadly aligned with Mark Dawson and Floris 
de Witte’s argument for a new constitution for the EU. Their conceptual starting point is a 
commitment to self-determination because this ‘offers a richer framework than the concept of 
democracy…as it is able to articulate the importance of the citizens’ actual capacity to affect the 
economic, social and moral texture of society’.108 Breaking down the concept of self-determination 
further, this may be regarded through an existentialist lens. It means facilitating the means by which 
individuals can construct their life-plans and thus determine their selves within the immutable 
constraints imposed by their facticity. To this end, Dawson and de Witte’s proposals to provide a 
framework which enables the space for political contestation over substantive policy goals with 
resultant institutional reform and a legal order which facilitates rather than stifles such discourse 
are desirable. However, the crucial missing part of Dawson and de Witte’s jigsaw is the creation 
of this collective self which would be empowered to determine its destiny. They discuss reforms 
to enable the European Parliament to be ‘a forum for the citizen qua European’.109 However, this 
‘qua’ – a capacity for individuals to act as citizens of Europe – is assumed to pre-exist. This is 
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because such an incipient class of Europeans who have chosen to rely upon the rights and status 
that they have been passively granted by the Treaties is evident. Yet this collective does not have 
the means to represent itself independently in the constitution and polity-building process that 
Dawson and de Witte envisage. Therefore, I would advocate that any new constitutional settlement 
for Europe must be predicated first upon enabling the incipient subjects of this constitutional 
order to shape their political destiny through the creation of a status that enables them to exercise 
pouvoir constituant.110           
 Indeed, the fact that the pre-existing status of citizenship of the Union has only ever been 
supplemental to the pre-existing status of nationality of the Member States means that the creation 
of such a constitution for Europe could avoid the classic legitimacy dilemma posed by Hannah 
Arendt: ‘[T]hose who get together to constitute a new government are themselves 
unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority to do what they have set out to achieve’.111 In this 
sense, the fact that the citizenship of the European Union as a status of political subjecthood pre-
exists means that it may be used as a vessel for the legitimacy of the new constitutional project. 
The crucial feature is that the pre-existing status of nationality upon which the genesis and 
development of EU citizenship depends would not be extinguished by the emancipation of the 
latter from the former. The creation of an autonomous citizenry of Europe can also be seen to 
reconcile the dichotomy that Bellamy proposes between the ‘choice’ and the ‘civic’ accounts of 
political belonging. Bellamy outlines that ‘the choice account involves the importance of our being 
able to choose which political community we belong to…legitimacy depends on its [political 
authority] being freely chosen by those subject to it’.112 By contrast, ‘the civic account for ensuring 
the legitimacy of the political authority applies even to those who have not moved or chosen but 
rather acquired citizenship through birth. This account rests on the political authority being under 
the free and equal democratic control of those subject to it’.113 Bellamy argues that ‘the choice and 
civic accounts are not incompatible, rather the choice account is parasitic on the civic account’114 
because individuals either retain their civic obligations in their home Member State after moving 
or acquire the obligations of their host Member States. However, providing the capacity for 
individuals to choose to become European citizens would turn this relationship upon its head – 
the civic account of obligations that individuals are subject to regardless of their individual choice 
on a case-to-case basis would be predicated upon an initial choice to adhere to a particular vision 
of a polity and the consequent construction thereof. In contrast to the philosophically anarchist 
choice accounts, individuals would not be free to eschew by emigrating away from the territory of 
the state the obligations, status, and identity that are imposed upon them by the facticity of their 
nationality. This original choice account would make the hitherto metaphorical notion of a social 
contract, which is used to retrospectively justify the imposition of political obligations, a reality for 
the prospective construction of a political community.     
 In practical terms, it is envisaged that such a choice to become a European citizen would 
form the initial stage of a European-wide process of constitutional consultation. This may take the 
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form of a pan-European referendum as envisaged by Joseph Weiler already in 1998.115 
Alternatively, it may take the form of a representative constitutional convention or assembly. 
However, the representative deficiency of the intergovernmental conference on the draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe must be avoided in constructing such a convention. The 
prevarication over whether the 2005 settlement represented a ‘Constitution’ or retained the 
international law character of ‘Treaty’ must also be avoided. It is suggested that the initial 
‘electorate’ for such a decision would have to be all of those individuals who currently hold the 
status of citizen of the European Union by virtue of being a national of a Member State. This 
would be necessary to ensure the continuity whereby the legitimacy of the new status, manifested 
in the form of popular democratic consensus, would be a logical continuation underpinned by the 
legitimacy of the old status, manifested in the form of state consent to a Treaty under international 
law.            
 Although those who have exercised their free movement rights may be the most amenable 
to the emancipation of EU citizenship, such exercise of rights should not be a necessary condition 
for making the self-determinative choice to retain EU citizenship as this would constitute a form 
of inequality. The ideal case of the prototype European citizen would be the individual who has 
constructed an identity and shared solidarity as ‘European’ beyond the material benefits that they 
receive from the rights flowing from this status. However, it would be expected that certain 
individuals would choose to attain the status for such instrumental reasons without feeling any 
such attachment to the new polity. Although this phenomenon cannot be prevented if we are 
committed to providing a free choice to all present EU citizens, it can be mitigated through the 
construction of citizenship duties, such as direct taxation of income which may be used to 
construct financial assistance mechanisms as considered below. As Weiler observes116, these 
demands that the new polity asks of its members would be crucial in guaranteeing the bare 
minimum of solidarity to sustain a community orientated towards the flourishing of all of its 
members as a collective rather than citizenship being a mere instrumental status used only to secure 
individual preferences.         
 Presuming that the legal question of whether Member State withdrawal necessarily 
extinguishes EU citizenship does not arise again when this situation is no longer hypothetical, the 
limitation of the franchise to nationals of the Member States would mean that nationals of the 
United Kingdom would not be entitled to choose whether to acquire the new status. However, it 
is suggested that the wholesale extinction of the status of EU citizenship for individuals holding 
the nationality of a former Member State could be regarded as a learning experience and the 
incentive for the emancipation of the status to ensure that such a capacity for self-determination 
regarding political status is not removed from European individuals again. Following the initial 
(re)creation of European citizenship, it is suggested that those holding the status could decide 
upon the conditions for third country nationals – including United Kingdom nationals – to acquire 
citizenship. Conditions analogous to naturalisation requirements for the acquisition of nationality 
could be established. The most prominent of such would likely be residence in the territory of the 
European Union.  As such, it may be argued that residence truly would become the new primary 
means of belonging within the new European polity. 117  
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 Such a decision should not be seen either as entailing the creation of a federal United States 
of Europe that would replace the Member State polities, nor as a process of completely replacing 
the current Treaty based structure of the European Union. Instead, it is envisaged that European 
citizenship would operate in the same manner as dual-citizenship of current nation states, meaning 
individuals would retain the citizenship of the state in which they were born. This would in effect 
lead to the creation of a European polity that is insulated from the national polities and has a 
horizontal relationship with them as opposed to the current ambiguous supranational hierarchical 
relationship. Although there is not space to go into detail here, it is also submitted that such a 
constitutionalisation of a European citizenry could provide some form of solution to the problems 
of the primacy or supremacy of EU law by defining competences not on the basis of functional 
policy goals, but on the basis of what individuals are the objects of the legal order. The creation of 
this constitutional order would then enable the Member States of the European Union to continue 
their cooperation in a more traditional intergovernmental manner fields of competence, such as 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which may be decided to fall outside of the defined 
scope of the new European constitution. From this perspective, the proposal for an autonomous 
citizenry of the Union may be regarded as analogous to the numerous political proposals for a 
‘Core Europe’.118 Crucially, however, the constituent subjects and legal objects of this core Europe 
would be individuals as opposed to states. And like the state-based Core Europe proposals, the 
idea would be that those who choose to become European citizens would constitute a vanguard 
with the choice being left open for individuals to join in the future.    
 Perhaps the greatest practical impact that such an autonomous form of European 
citizenship could have in the lives of individuals is the means it would provide to create European 
level mechanisms of redistribution. Academics can be preoccupied with abstract concepts such as 
identity, belonging, and solidarity; however, I would submit that for most individuals what is most 
important is whether institutions can guarantee the resources and welfare that enable them to 
pursue life plans with autonomy and dignity. In this regard, an autonomous European citizenry 
and a new constitutional process provides the means to decouple the access to social assistance 
for mobile citizens from domestic political processes. A situation akin to John Rawls’ ‘original 
position’119 could be initiated by this constitutional moment, enabling individuals to express their 
voice in a collective process of will-formation regarding what forms of redistribution might be 
suitable for European individuals – if indeed any. This could provide the opportunity for radical 
experimentation with welfare mechanisms liberated from the path dependency which has seen 
national welfare systems become outmoded. For example, Phillipe Van Parijs’ arguments for a 
universal basic income, to be paid to all European citizens, could be a potential model.120  
 In this regard, the proposal for an autonomous European citizenship could benefit people 
from all strata of society. The potential uncoupling of the legal rights to move to and establish 
oneself in another state from employment, education status, or sufficient financial means could 
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alleviate the inequality of EU citizens on the basis of socioeconomic status. Furthermore, the 
emancipation of EU citizenship could address the current situation in which individuals can fall 
through the cracks of welfare entitlement in their host and home Member States due to the current 
paradigm of welfare ‘coordination’.121 The potential creation of direct financial assistance through 
an autonomous European welfare system could provide a safety net for individuals in the pursuit 
of their life plans across Europe. Importantly, the financial reserves that such individuals would 
draw upon would not be those generated through the thick historical social solidarity that 
underpins national welfare systems. These mechanisms have been a political arena for resistance 
against the claims of mobile EU citizens who are perceived not to have contributed to this 
common good. Instead, the reserves would be generated by those individuals who have chosen to 
contribute financially to a European welfare system on the basis of the solidarity of common values 
and experiences that inform the free choice to become a European citizen.  This could address the 
academic criticisms regarding the perceived lacuna of the ‘regression era’, and provide the material 
means to fulfil the legal promise of Article 20 TFEU to allow individuals to move and reside freely 
across the territory of the European Union.  Crucially, however, if we are to retain our commitment 
to the self-determination of the incipient citizenry of Europe, this collective should be free to 
determine the mechanisms itself through democratic deliberation, or indeed to choose not to 
create any such means of financial assistance.       
 The gravest practical challenge to the proposal for an autonomous European citizenry 
constituting a new European constitutional polity is the question of territory, and accommodating 
the rights and obligations of national and European citizens within this territory. Meticulous 
deliberation would be required to determine aspects such as whether European citizens should 
pay taxes to the state of residence or to the European budget. However, I would submit that it is 
not impossible to disentangle these obligations, for example through companies being 
incorporated as European companies for the purpose of income tax, whereas taxes on real-estate 
and residence would be under the control of the state of residence. A radical idea for how to solve 
the territory problem would see the territory of the new European polity being physically 
constituted by a network of European cities. Such a proposal would see the concept of ‘citizenship’ 
resituated ontologically within the concept of ‘city’.       
 The everyday life practices and experiences of individuals are congruent in European cities 
across nations. Although many more cultural and sociological features contribute to solidarity and 
common identity, it is tentatively submitted that this similarity of life practice may be generative 
of the cultivation of shared values between individuals in these urban centres. It is suggested that 
the solidarity that is founded upon such shared values may be sufficient to sustain an autonomous 
European society within these cities.122 The political and legal governance of such a society would 
thus constitute a form of network polity. Such a proposal for both a radical devolution of 
governance to the local level and the radical expansion of communitarian belonging to the 
European level would overhaul the Westphalian model of state sovereignty within demarcated 
borders. However, I would submit that such a reformulation of political and social belonging in 
Europe would more accurately reflect the current cleavages of identity and values between, inter 
alia, generations and regions in the modern world.     
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 Finally, the choice of the means of implementation is crucial. One may delineate three 
means by which an autonomous status of EU citizenship may be (re)constructed from the current 
regime. The first and most radical method would be the ‘constitutive leap of faith’ whereby every 
present EU citizen would be given the choice whether they wish to be citizens of Europe or not. 
This initial collective self-determination would set into motion the constituent process of 
constructing a European polity. The advantage of a dramatic break from the inertia that the 
European project faces would also entail the significant disadvantage in practice of the wholesale 
loss of legal status and rights that would face every individual who did not choose the status. In 
terms of practicability, it is also difficult to envisage a situation in which the Member States of the 
European Union acting either as the ‘Masters of the Treaty’ or within the institution of the 
European Council would mandate such a process. If such a process were to be initiated in 
revolutionary opposition to the current predominant constitutional actors within the European 
order, then one would be faced with the crisis of legitimacy delineated by Hannah Arendt and 
alluded to above.          
 The second method would be an ‘incremental and complementary’ proposal. The current 
legal form and conditions for acquisition of EU citizenship would remain as defined in Article 20 
TFEU. Complementary functions, duties, and rights could then be created in accordance with the 
Article 25 TFEU process in order to imbue the status with further legal substance. For example, 
European welfare rights and duties could be established by the Council with the consent of the 
European Parliament to address the problematique perceived by scholars during the ‘regression era’ 
discussed above. Such a process could also be used to amend or reform the political rights within 
Article 20(2)(b) TFEU. This incremental substantiation could then be tested in practice, and only 
after this experience could there be consideration of ‘constitutional’ reform whereby Member 
States may be persuaded to transfer certain competence and governance functions to the level of 
a ‘European polity’. Such transfer could be regarded as the ‘constitutional moment’ for the newly 
autonomous European citizenry, at which point those individuals who hold the status could be 
given the choice whether to retain or to divest themselves of the constituent status. The 
continuance of the incremental method of European integration would prevent a wholesale loss 
of the status and rights of EU citizenship for individuals who hypothetically may not choose to 
acquire the status. However, such a continuation would not represent the leap of faith whereby 
the future design of the status of citizenship and the consequent constitutional order would be 
within the control of those who choose to hold the status.     
 The third-way compromise between these two proposals would be a ‘phasing out’ of the 
conditions for acquisition of EU citizenship. Under this proposal, those who have passively 
acquired EU citizenship under the present regime will retain the status. However, a form of ‘sunset 
clause’ could be established either through the Article 25 TFEU procedure or if necessary through 
a Treaty reform whereby those born after an established date would no longer automatically 
acquire EU citizenship. Instead, this new generation of Europeans would be given to opportunity 
to choose to become citizens of Europe upon reaching adulthood. This would precipitate the 
opportunity to foster popular legitimacy over an extended period of gestation. The advantage of 
this approach is that it would prevent the ‘guillotine’ effect of an immediate choice for individuals 
either to retain or lose their status and rights. However, as opposed to the second proposal above, 
it would enable a more radical reform of the means of acquisition, moving from the present regime 
of passive acquisition to the paradigm of active self-determinative choice. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that this could better retain the ‘duality’ and ‘supranationality’ of the Union’s 
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constitutional order due to the fact that it would be clear to this new generation that their 
‘nationality’ functions as their chronologically prior status before a ‘graduation’ to citizenship of 
Europe. This would prevent the risk of a disruptive separation of the Member State and European 
constitutional orders and the charge of illegitimacy of the new order. These three proposals are 
merely suggestions for possible courses of action, which represents the limits of what academics 
may legitimately propose. If any such emancipation of citizenship of Europe were to occur in 
practice, the method by which it would proceed would need to be deferred to the choice of the 
incipient people of Europe.123 
 
V. CONCLUSION: EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP AS EXISTENTIAL FREEDOM 
The analysis of the eras of the development of citizenship of the European Union and different 
normative positions regarding this has led to the picture of a partial status that finds itself in limbo. 
On the one hand, the limited nature of the rights it provides to individuals without a means for 
political self-determination means that its apparent destiny of becoming a fundamental status 
appears doomed. On the other hand, the experimental way in which the entitlements provided by 
the status have been expanded ex post facto by the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union may be regarded as undermining the democratic capacity for self-determination of the 
citizens of the Member States in which mobile Union citizens integrate. A regression by the Court 
of Justice back from this expansive case-law is untenable, however, without creating injustice for 
those mobile individuals who have come to rely upon the entitlements that have been bestowed 
upon them by their citizenship of the Union.       
 The solution proposed in this paper, therefore, is to emancipate European citizenry 
through a radical constitutional process which would enable it to become a fundamental status for 
those individuals who choose it. To return to the introduction’s analogy with the existentialist 
philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, it may be argued that the challenges to traditional conceptions of 
political communities posed by regional integration within the European Union and beyond has 
placed the concept of polity in an analogous existential crisis to individuals confronted with the 
blank slate of their human nature. In the same way that human beings are struck with nausea at 
the realisation that there is no objective essence that precedes their existence, modernity has shown 
that there is no objective essence to political belonging of a demos based on a defined identity that 
transcends the immediate existence of the members of the polity. The current existential crisis of 
the European Union provides individuals with the opportunity to embrace and exercise this 
existential freedom in order to construct their own polity and community. Crucially, however, such 
construction of a fundamental political status of belonging should be pursued ex ante through 
democratic self-determination expressed in a process of constitution founding, rather than being 
pursued ex post through a judicial body’s interpretation of a limited set of international treaty rights.  
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